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We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify
brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking.
Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for
false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone’s
mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous
account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found
common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left
but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the
left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general
fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left
middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is
linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The
EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another’s viewpoint is
adopted.
Keywords: neuroimaging meta-analysis, theory of mind, false belief, visual perspective taking, temporo-parietal
junction
INTRODUCTION
Being able to adopt another person’s perspective is an important
feature of human social cognition. In the last decade and a half,
functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying this ability. Two lines of research have
emerged. One group of studies has looked at perspective relevant
processes in the context of visuo-spatial cognition, typically by
asking about the visual experience arising from a different point
of view (visual perspective taking). Studies in this field can be
divided into level 1 and 2 visual perspective taking (Masangkay
et al., 1974; Flavell et al., 1981). Level 1 perspective taking refers
to the ability to distinguish what people can and cannot see, e.g.,
that two persons looking at different sides of a piece of paper see
different things. Level 2 perspective taking refers to the ability to
understand that when two persons look at an object from dif-
ferent viewpoints or angles, they arrive at different and maybe
contradictory descriptions. Besides research on visual perspective
taking, another group of studies has looked at perspective relevant
processing in social contexts. The terms “mentalizing”, “mind
reading” or “theory of mind” refer to our ability to think about
the mental states—such as thoughts and beliefs—of ourselves and
others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). A way to test children’s
ability to attribute mental states to others is the false belief task.
Children are told a story in which a character, Mistaken Max, fails
to witness how his chocolate is unexpectedly transferred from one
location to another. Therefore, he believes that the chocolate is
still in its original location. Children have to predict whether he
will look for the chocolate in its original or in its new location.
To arrive at the correct answer—its original location—children
have to take into account that Mistaken Max holds a false belief
about the location of the chocolate, which contrasts with their
own knowledge about its real location.
Developmental research showed that the ability to make cor-
rect level 2 visual perspective judgments emerges about 2 years
later than the ability to master these judgments at level 1
(Masangkay et al., 1974). At the same time when children start
to master level 2 judgments—at around 4 to 5 years of age—they
also start to pass the false belief test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Hamilton et al. (2009) found that theory of mind performance
(assessed with a set of tasks including the false belief task) signif-
icantly predicted performance on a level 2 visual perspective task
in a sample of 4–8 year old children. In contrast, neither perfor-
mance on a mental rotation task nor children’s verbal mental age
showed a relation to level 2 visual perspective taking. One expla-
nation (e.g., Perner et al., 2003; Perner and Rössler, 2012) for this
link between level 2 visual perspective and false belief understand-
ing is that both tasks require an understanding of perspective, i.e.,
that different persons can have different views on/or beliefs about
one and the same state of affairs. In addition, for both tasks chil-
dren must be able to intentionally switch to another perspective.
Brain activation for false belief reasoning was mostly studied
by presenting short stories to adult participants, and results
show a consistent network of brain areas activated (see e.g.,
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe and Powell,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 712 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Schurz et al. Meta-analysis visual perspective taking
2006), including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), bilateral
temporal poles, the precuneus, and bilateral temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) areas. The mPFC was linked to the processing of
socially and emotionally relevant information about other people
that is contained in the stories, but not specifically linked to the
processing of belief (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Saxe, 2006; Saxe and
Powell, 2006). For example, an fMRI study found that the mPFC
was equally engaged by stories about a person’s thoughts and by
stories about a person’s physical appearance or bodily sensations
(Saxe and Powell, 2006). The temporal poles were linked to the
retrieval of social semantic knowledge from long-term memory,
which takes place because participants read stories about persons
in social situations (e.g., Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Ross and
Olson, 2010). Based on its engagement in visuo-spatial mental
imagery (e.g., Ghaem et al., 1997; Hanakawa et al., 2003), it
was assumed that the precuneus subserves mental imagery to
represent another person’s perspective in theory of mind tasks
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). Similarly, the TPJ areas were linked
to the representation of mental and non-mental perspectives
(Perner et al., 2006; Perner and Leekam, 2008). The right TPJ
was specifically linked to the representation of beliefs, as it was
found to respond more strongly when reading statements about
a person’s thoughts than when reading statements about physical
appearance or bodily sensations (Saxe and Powell, 2006), and
also compared to reading statements about a person’s emotions
and perceptions (Zaitchik et al., 2010). In another study, an
interesting observation was made for the left TPJ. Perner et al.
(2006) presented a novel condition—false sign stories—in
addition to the standard false belief and photo control stories.
An example for a false sign story is: “The sign to the monastery
points to the path through the woods. While playing, the children
make the sign point to the golf course. According to the sign the
monastery is now in the direction of the . . . golf course / woods”.
False sign stories present a very different problem than false belief
stories which require figuring out an internal and unobservable
mental state of another person. False sign stories simply require
reflecting upon the external and directly observable world—the
direction to where a sign is pointing. Nevertheless, Perner et al.
(2006) found equally high activation for false sign stories as for
false belief stories in the left TPJ (but not in the right TPJ). A
significantly lower level of activation was found for photo control
stories. These findings suggest that the left TPJ is responsible for
an operation that is common to reasoning about false belief and
false signs: processing of a perspective difference, regardless of
whether it is an unobservable inner state (belief) or a visible state
(where the sign points). Both in the case of false belief stories
and false sign stories, two contrasting perspectives of one and
the same state of affairs are involved: the belief of a person that
contrasts with one’s own knowledge of reality, or the location to
which a sign is pointing that contrasts with one’s own knowledge
about the real location of a target.
In comparison to the detailed picture that has already emerged
for the neural correlates of false belief reasoning, brain imaging
evidence on visual perspective taking is relatively scattered and
has been discussed less extensively. To our knowledge, no system-
atic review or meta-analysis of visual perspective studies has been
done yet. When contrasting judgments about another person’s
perspective with judgments about one’s own perspective (level 1
and 2 taken together) studies mainly found activation in three
areas: (i) Lateral prefrontal cortices (e.g., Vogeley et al., 2004;
Aichhorn et al., 2006; David et al., 2006, 2008; Dumontheil et al.,
2010; Mazzarella et al., 2013), (ii) bilateral parietal and temporo-
parietal areas (Vogeley et al., 2004; David et al., 2006, 2008;
Kaiser et al., 2008; Mazzarella et al., 2013) and (iii) the precuneus
(Vogeley et al., 2004; Kaiser et al., 2008; Dumontheil et al., 2010).
The lateral prefrontal cortices – in particular the inferior frontal
gyri—are engaged by cognitive control in interference tasks, such
as the color-word Stroop task or stimulus-response reversal stud-
ies (for review see Derrfuss et al., 2005). Likewise, researchers
linked these areas to the inhibition of the irrelevant own perspec-
tive when making visual perspective judgments (McCleery et al.,
2011; Ramsey et al., 2013). Activation in temporo-parietal areas
was linked to the representation of perspectives, and in particular
to the representation of differences in perspective and owner-
ship of perspective (McCleery et al., 2011). In addition, Ramsey
et al. (2013) suggested that superior parietal areas are engaged in
perspective selection, i.e., in choosing the relevant over the irrel-
evant perspective. This was assumed to take place in cooperation
with lateral prefrontal areas, forming a functional network that
is sometimes referred to as the “fronto-parietal control network”
(e.g., Vincent et al., 2008). The precuneus was rarely mentioned
when discussing the neurocognitive processes subserving visual
perspective taking, although it is implicated in multiple forms of
visuo-spatial mental imagery (e.g., Ghaem et al., 1997; Hanakawa
et al., 2003).
Our review of the neuroimaging literature on false belief rea-
soning and visual perspective taking showed that both discussed
the left TPJ and the precuneus as candidate areas for represent-
ing perspectives and perspective differences. Only little functional
imaging research has addressed this connection. To our knowl-
edge, no study has directly compared activation for false belief
reasoning to activation for visual perspective taking. Aichhorn
et al. (2006) measured brain activation for level 2 visual perspec-
tive taking, and asked participants to judge the spatial arrange-
ment of two objects (e.g., “the block is in front of the pole”)
from the viewpoint of an avatar. The authors found brain acti-
vation for level 2 perspective taking—compared to making the
same judgments from one’s own viewpoint—in an area of the left
TPJ that was also activated in a number of earlier studies on the-
ory of mind (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000; Ruby and Decety, 2003;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). Aichhorn et al. (2006) therefore con-
cluded that the left TPJ is responsible for representing different
perspectives and is commonly engaged by tasks which require
such processing. However, a more recent study provided evidence
against this interpretation. David et al. (2008) asked participants
to either make a visual perspective or a mentalizing (preference)
judgment with respect to two objects in front of an avatar. The
avatar was facing participants. In the level 2 perspective judg-
ment, participants were asked which of the two objects (left or
right) was elevated from the avatar’s point of view. For exam-
ple, if the elevated object was on the left from the avatar’s point
of view, this implied that it was shown on the right side of the
image to participants. In the preference judgment, participants
were asked to judge which object the avatar would prefer—based
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on his gestures (e.g., pointing at one object) and facial expression.
During the judgments participants always indicated the object as
seen from their own perspective. The comparison of brain activa-
tion between the tasks showed two completely distinct networks
of brain activation and no overlap in the left TPJ. Therefore,
David et al. (2008) concluded that visual perspective taking and
mentalizing rely on different cortical mechanisms.
Studies that compared brain activation for visual perspec-
tive taking and mentalizing show contradictory results. However,
these studies never directly compared activation for false belief
reasoning with visual perspective taking. As we have outlined
above, both developmental research and neurocognitive theories
speak for a functional link between these tasks. The present study
evaluates the functional overlap between false belief reasoning
and visual perspective taking by means of a quantitative meta-
analysis of brain imaging studies. To increase statistical power, we
analyze both level 1 and 2 visual perspective taking studies in our
meta-analysis. Based on the reviewed literature, we expect to find
a functional overlap in the left TPJ and in the precuneus.
METHODS
We performed key-word searches in the databases PubMed,
Science Citation Index, and PsycInfo. The first criterion of our
search was that studies included one of the key-words “neu-
roimaging” or “fMRI” or “PET”. For our false belief meta-
analysis, the second criterion was that studies further included
the key-words “false belief” or “theory of mind”. For our visual
perspective taking meta-analysis, the second criterion was that
studies included the key-words “perspective taking” or “visual
perspective” or “viewer rotation”1. In a second step, we extended
our literature samples by searching the reference lists of recent
meta-analyses on theory of mind and social cognition (Mar, 2011;
Bzdok et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2012) as
well as the reference lists of most recent publications on visual
perspective taking (Lambrey et al., 2012; Mazzarella et al., 2013;
Ramsey et al., 2013).
We then applied a number of methodological selection-criteria
to the literature identified by our search (see e.g., Radua et al.,
2012). Studies were only selected if they had performed a whole
brain analysis and reported activation coordinates in standard
space (MNI or Talairach). We ensured that the same threshold
throughout the whole brain was used within each included study,
in order to avoid biases toward liberally thresholded brain regions.
This does not mean that different studies should employ the same
threshold.We included 25 studies (N = 419) in ourmeta-analysis
on false belief and 14 studies (N = 216) in our meta-analysis on
visual perspective taking. We used Effect-Size Signed Differential
Mapping (ES-SDM) software, version 2.31 for meta-analysis
(Radua et al., 2010, 2012; http://www.sdmproject.com). ES-SDM
uses standard effect size and variance-based meta-analytic calcu-
lations. Based on the reported t-values and the sample size of
a study, ES-SDM creates a map of effect-sizes (Hedge’s g val-
ues) and their variances. Variance is estimated from the map
1Viewer rotation’ refers to an imagined change of one’s own point of view,
i.e., imagining oneself rotating around an object in space, arriving at a new
viewpoint on it.
of effect-sizes and the sample size of the study. Effect- sizes are
exactly calculated for those voxels containing a peak reported in
the results table of an original study. For the rest of the voxels, an
effect-size is estimated depending on the distance to close peaks
(<20mm) by means of an unnormalized Gaussian kernel. In
the present analysis, we used the recommended Gaussian kernel
with a FWHM of 20mm. A validation study which compared the
results of coordinate based ES-SDM meta-analysis to the results
of a standard voxel-wise GLM analysis of the same original data
(Radua et al., 2012) found that this FWHM provided an optimal
balance between sensitivity and specificity. For statistical-analysis,
all foci were transformed to Talairach space which is the native
space of the software, by using the matrix transformations pro-
posed by Lancaster et al. (2007). We calculated a mean analysis
for each task-group. Calculation of the meta-analytic mean map
is implemented by a random-effects model in which each study is
weighted by the inverse of the sum of its variance plus an esti-
mate of between-study heterogeneity. The latter is obtained by
the DerSimonian-Laird method (DerSimonian and Laird, 1986).
This approach enables studies with larger sample size or lower
variability to contribute more and that effects are assumed to
randomly vary between samples. The statistical significance was
assessed by a permutation test; 100 random maps were generated
with the same number of input foci as included in the to-be-tested
map (see Radua et al., 2012). Finally, the meta-analytic maps were
thresholded using a voxel-level (height) threshold of p < 0.005
(uncorrected) and a cluster-level (extent) threshold of 10 vox-
els. This uncorrected threshold was found to optimally balance
sensitivity and specificity, and to be an approximate equivalent
to a corrected threshold of p < 0.05 in original neuroimaging
studies (Radua et al., 2012). We performed a conjunction anal-
ysis (see Figure 1B) with the “image calculator” utility in SPM8
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Conjoint activation is determined by a
voxel-wise combination of results by a logical AND function. For
convenience, we report all activations in MNI-space.
RESULTS
FALSE BELIEF REASONING
Studies on false-belief reasoning mainly used two types of tasks.
One group of studies contrasted stories about false belief with sto-
ries about an outdated photograph. We give some examples in
Table 1. In total, we found 15 studies (reported in 14 publica-
tions) that relied on this type of contrast (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe and Powell,
2006; Saxe et al., 2006; Young et al., 2007, 2010, 2011; Kliemann
et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Young and Saxe,
2009; Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011). In the false belief
story a short text passage is presented, which involves a person
holding a false belief. A test question asks participants about the
belief or its behavioral consequences. In the control task, a short
text passage describes a photograph (or a similar physical rep-
resentation) of the past, together with a note about how things
shown on the photograph have changed by now. Participants are
asked what is shown on the photo. Another more heterogeneous
group of studies presented similar stories about false belief. In this
group of studies, however, stories of different length and richness
were presented, and different types of control stories were used.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Results of meta-analyses for false belief reasoning (blue) and
visual perspective taking (red). Overlap between result maps is shown in
purple. (B) Results of a conjunction analysis searching for brain areas active
for false belief reasoning AND visual perspective taking. All maps were
thresholded at voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected and a cluster
extent threshold 10 voxels.
We give some examples for false belief studies of our second group
in the lower part of Table 1. The common element of these studies
is that they present a story (sentence or cartoon format) about a
person that holds a false belief as activation tasks. Participants are
asked a question which relates to the false belief of the person. In
the control condition, again a story about a person is presented,
but here the person does not hold a false belief. Participants are
asked about non-mental state information in the story. In total,
we found 10 studies that relied on this type of contrast (Fletcher
et al., 1995; Happé et al., 1996; Gallagher et al., 2000; Nieminen-
von Wendt et al., 2003; Hynes et al., 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2006,
2007; Gobbini et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2010; Jimura et al.,
2010). We pooled the two groups of tasks that present stories
about false belief into one single meta-analysis (total n = 25).
We performed ameta-analysis on the reported activationmaps
for the contrast false belief stories > control stories. Results are
shown in blue in Figure 1A and are listed in Table 2. The largest
cluster of meta-analytic convergence was found in the mPFC,
including parts of dorsal and ventral mPFC and the anterior
cingulate gyrus. Another large cluster of convergence was found
in precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus bilaterally. Further
clusters of convergent activation were found in bilateral temporo-
parietal areas, spanning across parts of middle and superior
temporal gyri up to the inferior parietal lobule (up to z = 42).
Two smaller clusters of convergence were found in anterior parts
of the right temporal lobe.
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Compared to the large number of imaging studies on false belief
reasoning, relatively few imaging studies on visual perspective
taking exist. We identified three groups of visual perspective tasks
in the literature: level 1 visual perspective taking (3 studies), level
2 visual perspective taking (5 studies), and level 2 imagined viewer
rotation (6 studies). Due to the small sample-sizes of these task-
groups, it was not possible to perform individual meta-analyses.
We therefore decided to merge the different visual perspective
tasks into a pooled analysis, which gave us a large enough sam-
ple for quantitative meta-analytic calculations (n = 14). Later
on (see section Region of interest based review), we provide a
complementary results overview for individual task-types.
Table 3 gives task-descriptions for all visual-perspective tak-
ing studies in our meta-analysis. Level 1 visual perspective taking
studies typically present a scene with an avatar and a number
of objects. Participants are asked how many of these objects the
avatar can see (while some of the objects are behind the avatars’
back). In the control conditions of level 1 visual perspective tak-
ing studies, participants are asked how many objects they can
see themselves2. Level 2 visual perspective taking tasks also typ-
ically present a scene with an avatar and a number of objects.
However, here the avatar is able to see all of the objects in the
2A recent level 1 visual perspective taking study (Ramsey et al., 2013) did not
look at the contrast other> self, but at interactions between perspective taking
(self vs. other) and the consistency of perspectives (i.e., do self and other per-
spectives differ in the task-response that they require?). Ramsey et al.’s (2013)
results show that the consistency between perspectives is an important and
previously ignored determinant of brain activation. However, these data go
beyond the scope of the present meta-analysis and cannot be synthesized with
results from other studies in our meta-analysis. Therefore, we did not include
Ramsey et al.’s (2013) study in our analysis.
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Table 1 | Examples for false belief reasoning tasks.
Author Activation task Control task
FALSE BELIEF VIGNETTES VS. PHOTO CONTROL VIGNETTES (3 EXAMPLES OUT OF 15 STUDIES)
Aichhorn et al., 2009 Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Predict the behavior of that person based on her
belief. e.g.: ’Julia sees the ice cream van go to the lake.
She doesn’t see that the van turns off to the town hall.
Therefore, Julia will look for the ice cream van at the . . . ?’
(lake or town hall).
Read a short vignette involving a photograph of the past, and a
description how things shown on the photo have changed by
now. Answer a question about the outdated scene shown on
the photo. e.g.: ‘Julia takes a picture of the ice-van in front of
the pond. The ice cream van changes to the market place; the
picture gets developed. On the picture, the ice-van is at the . . .
?’ (pond or market place).
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003 Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Answer a question about her belief. e.g.: ’John told
Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford.
Emily doesn’t know anything about cars so she believed
John. When Emily sees John’s car, she thinks it is a . . . ?’
(Porsche or Ford).
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo. e.g.: ‘A
photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch.
The film took half an hour to develop. In the meantime, a
strong wind blew the apple to the ground. The developed
photograph shows the apple on the . . . ?’ (tree or ground).
Lee et al., 2011 Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Answer a question about her belief. e.g.: ’David
knows that Ethan is very scared of spiders. Ethan, alone in
the attic, sees a shadow move and thinks it is a burglar.
David hears Ethan cry for help. David assumes that Ethan
thinks he has seen . . . ?’
(a spider or a burglar).
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo. e.g.: ‘Amy
made a drawing of a treehouse three years ago. That was
before the storm. We built a new treehouse last summer, but
we painted it red instead of blue. The treehouse in Amy ’s
drawing is . . . ?’ (red or blue).
FALSE BELIEF STORIES VS. CONTROL STORIES (2 EXAMPLES OUT OF 10 STUDIES)
Abraham et al., 2010 Read a story describing a character’s mental state
(belief/desire) about an object. Then the object in reality is
described. Indicate if the character is surprised/delighted
by the reality. e.g.: ‘Thomas believes that there will be a lot
of sugar in the chocolate pudding.–The chocolate pudding
does not taste sweet.–Would that surprise Thomas?’ (yes
or no).
Read a story describing a non-mental attribute of a group of
persons. Then a particular member of this group is introduced.
Indicate if that member holds the non-mental attribute
(syllogistic reasoning).e.g.: ‘All students at the dance academy
own more than three pairs of dance shoes.–Sonja studies
dance at the academy.–Does Sonja own more than three pairs
of dance shoes?’(yes or no).
Fletcher et al., 1995 Read a story about a character performing an action. The
reason for that action must be inferred from his/her false
belief (sometimes also ignorance). Explain (silently) why he
did that. e.g.: ‘A burglar who has just robbed a shop is
making his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman
on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn’t know the
man is a burglar, he just wants to tell him he dropped his
glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar,
“Hey, you! Stop!”, the burglar turns around, sees the
policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and
admits that he did the break-in at the local shop.’
Read a story about a character performing an action. The
reason for that action can be inferred from the information in
the story and is not related to false belief. Explain (silently)
why he did that. e.g.: ‘A burglar is about to break into a
jewelers’ shop. He skillfully picks the lock on the shop door.
Carefully he crawls under the electronic detector beam. If he
breaks this beam it will set off the alarm. Quietly he opens the
door of the store-room and sees the gems glittering. As he
reaches out, however, he steps on something soft. He hears a
screech and something small and furry runs out past him,
toward the shop door. Immediately, the alarm sounds.’
scene, but views them from a different angle. Participants are
asked to indicate the relative position of one object from the
avatar’s viewpoint. In the control condition of level 2 visual per-
spective tasks, participants are asked about the relative location of
one object from their own perspective. The last type of visual-
perspective taking tasks in our meta-analysis, level 2 imagined
viewer rotation tasks, typically present an array of objects and ask
to imagine viewing this array from a different angle. Then, partici-
pants are asked to indicate the relative position of one object from
the imagined viewpoint. Two types of control tasks are frequently
used in studies on imagined viewer rotation. In one type of con-
trol task, participants have to indicate the relative position of one
object in the array as seen from their actual viewpoint (similar to
the control conditions in level 2 visual perspective taking tasks).
In another type of control task, a so-called object rotation task,
participants are asked to imagine rotating the array around its
vertical axis (e.g., with their right hand), and then indicate the
current position of one object from their viewpoint.
We performed a meta-analysis on the reported activations for
all three types of visual perspective taking compared to their
respective control condition. Figure 1A shows clusters of reliable
meta-analytic convergence for visual perspective taking in red,
and results are listed in Table 2. The largest cluster of convergent
activation was found in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, with its
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Table 2 | Results of meta-analyses for False Belief Reasoning and Visual Perspective Taking.
Cluster center Individual foci
# Hem Label x y z BA z-val. vx x y z Label
FALSE BELIEF REASONING (25 STUDIES)
1 R Precuneus 6 −59 35 7 5.00 1282 4 −42 33 R cingulate
0 −72 38 L cuneus
0 −59 35 L precuneus
0 −42 35 L cingulate
2 R Supramarginal 62 −45 21 40 7.70 886 55 −67 15 R mid. temporal
47 −61 39 R angular
56 −56 25 R sup. temporal
58 −52 42 R inf. parietal
3 R Sup. temporal 51 −9 −9 22 3.21 326 61 −23 −17 R mid. temporal
61 −16 −15 R mid. temporal
4 R Sup. temporal 46 11 −24 38 2.606 207 48 8 −33 R sup. temporal
40 11 −22 R inf. frontal
5 L Mid. temporal −57 −65 27 39 6.58 917 −50 −61 45 L inf. parietal
−44 −61 40 L angular
−59 −56 29 L sup. temporal
−55 −47 28 L supramarginal
6 L Sup. frontal −5 60 21 9 6.42 2083 −18 47 29 L sup. frontal
−5 60 28 L med. frontal
3 48 −7 R ant. cingulate
4 50 33 R med. frontal
6 58 23 R sup. frontal
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING (14 STUDIES)
1 R Precentral 41 −8 54 4 2.69 72 58 1 32 R precentral
2 R Insula 44 15 2 13 2.53 21
3 L Inf. occipital −48 −80 2 18 2.74 71 −46 −77 11 L mid. occipital
4 L Mid. temporal −39 −73 32 39 2.53 101 −31 −81 33 L sup. occipital
−18 −63 40 L precuneus
5 Precuneus 0 −53 52 7 2.76 187 0 −66 54 precuneus
4 −54 50 R precuneus
6 L Cerebellum −27 −53 −35 2.73 175 −23 −55 −28 L cerebellum
−24 −59 −38 L cerebellum
7 L Inf. parietal −37 −43 47 40 2.95 252 −41 −59 42 L angular
−37 −60 33 L mid. temporal
8 L Mid. frontal −42 15 33 9 3.60 1054 −33 −5 62 L precentral
−42 5 34 L precentral
−38 7 13 L insula
−42 8 27 L inf. frontal
−44 14 −5 L insula
FALSE BELIEF and VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
1 R Precuneus 4 −54 50 7 2.66 46 6 −56 46 R precuneus
2 L Mid. temporal −39 −73 32 39 2.49 4
3 L Mid. occipital −49 −72 13 37 2.32 12
4 L Angular −41 −59 42 39 2.46 19 −41 −63 40 L angular
5 precuneus 0 −53 52 7 2.76 63 0 −66 54 precuneus
−5 −51 52 L precuneus
peak in the left middle frontal gyrus. The cluster further included
parts of the inferior frontal gyrus, the insula and the precentral
gyrus. In the right hemisphere, lateral prefrontal activation was
substantially smaller compared to the left. Two small clusters of
activation were found, located in the right precentral gyrus and
right insula. Larger clusters were found in the left inferior parietal
lobule and in the precuneus. The left inferior parietal cluster
included parts of the angular gyrus and the posterior middle tem-
poral gyrus. The precuneus cluster spanned both hemispheres. In
addition to the left inferior parietal area, two other clusters of
convergence were found in left temporo-parietal areas. One was
located in the left posterior middle temporal gyrus extending into
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Table 3 | ROI-based follow-up review: + signs denote that a study reported activation within 20mm distance to a peak of our meta-analytic
conjunction (20mm corresponds to the smoothness of meta-analysis).
First author PREC ANG OCC Persp. task Control task
LEVEL 1 VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Vogeley et al.,
2004
+ + You see a scene including an avatar and a
number of objects. Indicate how many objects
the avatar can see.
You see a scene including an avatar and a number
of objects. Indicate how many objects you see.
Kaiser et al.,
2008
+ + You see a scene including an avatar and a
number of objects. Indicate how many objects
the avatar can see.
You see a scene including an avatar and a number
of objects. Indicate how many objects you see.
Dumontheil
et al., 2010*
+ + You see a scene including an avatar and a
number of objects. Follow the avatar’s instruction
(e.g., ‘move the large object up’). This instruction
is dependent on the avatar’s perspective (e.g., he
can’t see the largest object in the scene).
You see a scene including an avatar and a number
of objects. Follow the avatar’s instruction (e.g.,
‘moves the large object up’). As a rule, if the avatar
has a male (female) voice, you can only move
certain objects.
LEVEL 2 VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Aichhorn et al.,
2006
You see a scene including an avatar and two
objects. Indicate their relative spatial
arrangement e.g., ’Block is in front of the pole’
from the viewpoint of an avatar.
You see a scene including an avatar and two
objects. Indicate their relative spatial arrangement




+ You see a scene including two avatars facing you.
You and the avatars play a ball-tossing game.
Take the perspective of one of them and indicate
in which direction (left or right) he must throw the
ball to pass it to the other avatar.
You see a scene including two avatars facing you.
You and the avatars play a ball-tossing game.
Indicate from your own perspective in which
direction (left or right) you must throw the ball to
pass it to one of the avatars.
David et al.,
2008
+ You see a scene including an avatar facing you
and two objects, located between you and the
avatar. Indicate from his perspective which object
(left or right) is elevated.
You see a scene including an avatar facing you and
two objects, located between you and the avatar.




+ You see a scene including an avatar and one
object. Indicate from the avatar’s perspective if
the object is to his left or right.
You see a scene including an avatar and one
object. Indicate from your own perspective if the
object is to your left or right.
Mazzarella et al.,
2013
+ You see a table with an object on it. An avatar
stands next to the table. Indicate from his
perspective if the object is to his left or right.
You see a table with an object on it. An avatar
stands next to the table. Indicate from your
perspective if the object is to your left or right.
LEVEL 2 IMAGINED VIEWER ROTATION
Creem et al.,
2001
+ You see an array of four objects. Imagine being
located in the array’s center. Then imagine that
your body position is rotated to a certain degree.
Perform a relative location judgment (which
object is on your right?).
You see an array of four objects. Imagine being
located in the array’s center. Stick to your actual
body orientation, do not imagine a rotation.
Perform a relative location judgment (which object
is on your right?).
Zacks et al.,
2003
+ + You see an array of four objects. Imagine viewing
the array from a different angle (i.e., imagine a
self-rotation around the array). Indicate if a
particular object is now on the left or right side of
the array.
You see an array of four objects. Imagine that the
array rotates along its vertical axis, while your own
position remains the same. Indicate if a particular
object is now on the left or right side of the array.
Wraga et al.,
2005
+ You see a Shepard-Metzler object. Imagine
viewing the object from a different angle (i.e.,
imagine a self-rotation around the array). Indicate
if you now can see a particular side of the object.
You see a Shepard-Metzler object. Imagine rotating
the object along. Indicate if you now can see a
particular side of the object.
(Continued)
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Table 3 | Continued
First author PREC ANG OCC Persp. task Control task
Creem-Regehr
et al., 2007
+ + You see an array of 6 objects surrounding a hand.
Imagine viewing the hand from the position of
one of the objects (i.e., imagine a self-rotation to
this position). Indicate if the thumb is now to your
left or right.
You see an array of 6 objects surrounding a hand.
Indicate from your actual viewpoint if the thumb is
to your left or right.
Wraga et al.,
2010
+ + + You see a Shepard-Metzler object. Imagine
viewing the object from a different angle (i.e.,
imagine a self-rotation around the array). Indicate
if you now can see a particular side of the object.
You see a Shepard-Metzler object. Imagine
holding the object in the right hand and rotating it
in a specific way. Indicate if you now can see a
particular side of the object.
Lambrey et al.,
2012
You see a table with objects on it. Imagine
rotating yourself around it to the position of an
avatar / arrow (activation collapsed). Memorize
the arrangement of objects from this perspective
(tested later).
You see a table with objects on it. Imagine
rotating the table until one object is in front of an
avatar / arrow (activation collapsed). Memorize the
current arrangement of objects from your own
perspective (tested later).
PREC . . . Precuneus x = 0, y = −53, z = 52; ANG . . . Angular Gyrus x = −41, y = −59, z = 42; OCC . . . Middle Occipital Gyrus x = −49, y = −72, z = 13;
*Dumontheil et al.’s (2010) study could also be classified as a level 2 perspective task. The picture stimuli used in the task show a level 1 perspective difference.
However, the task also presents statements (e.g., “move the large ball up”) that have to be interpreted from another person’s perspective. A correct interpretation
requires understanding that the other person has a different perspective of the entire scene (from his perspective, one particular ball is the largest of all, whereas
from one’s own point of view, another ball is the largest of all).
the superior occipital gyrus; the other located in the left inferior
and middle occipital gyri, near the location of the Extrastriate
Body Area (EBA, Downing et al., 2001). Finally, a cluster of con-
vergent activation was found in the left cerebellum (not visible in
Figure 1A because of its location buried underneath the cerebellar
surface).
CONJUNCTION ANALYSIS
Our conjunction analysis determined which brain areas showed
convergent activation for both false belief reasoning and visual
perspective taking. Results are listed in Table 2 and illus-
trated in Figure 1B. The largest areas of convergence for both
meta-analyses were found in bilateral precuneus, with a slightly
larger cluster in the left compared to the right precuneus.
Further conjoined clusters of convergence were found in the
left TPJ (angular gyrus and the posterior middle temporal
gyrus) and the left middle occipital gyrus corresponding to
the EBA.
REGION OF INTEREST BASED REVIEW
We followed-up the findings of our meta-analytic conjunction by
a region of interest (ROI) based review. This approach does not
include a statistical comparison. However, it gives an overview of
which visual perspective taking studies contributed to the meta-
analytic findings. We selected three peaks from our meta-analytic
conjunction as ROIs: precuneus (x = 0, y = −53, z = 52), left
dorsal TPJ/angular gyrus (x = −41, y = −59, z = 42) and left
middle occipital gyrus (x = −49, y = −72, z = 13). ROIs were
created by a 20mm spherical volume around the peak coor-
dinates. This radius corresponds to the size of the smoothing
(FWHM) used by our meta-analysis. The other peaks from our
conjunction analysis (left posterior middle temporal gyrus, right
precuneus) did not enter our ROI analysis because they were
located at too close distance to the three other ROIs, and were
therefore practically not separable from them.
For each study, we checked if any of the reported activation
coordinates fell within the 20mm sphere around the three peak
coordinates in the left precuneus, the left angular gyrus, and the
left middle occipital gyrus. Table 3 summarizes the results of this
review. It lists each study and indicates with a ‘+’ symbol if a study
reported activation within a ROI. Contributions to the meta-
analytic peak activation in the left angular gyrus were balanced
over the three types of visual perspective taking: level 1 visual
perspective (2/3 studies), level 2 visual perspective (3/5 studies),
and level 2 viewer rotation (2/6 studies). Contributions to the
peak activation in the left middle occipital gyrus were relatively
weak for level 1 visual perspective (1/3 studies) and level 2 visual
perspective (1/5 studies), but more substantial for level 2 viewer
rotation (4/6 studies). Contributions to the meta-analytic peak in
the left precuneus were relatively strong for level 1 visual perspec-
tive (3/3 studies), moderate for 2 viewer rotation (3/6 studies),
and completely absent for level 2 visual perspective (0/5 studies).
DISCUSSION
We meta-analyzed brain activation for false-belief reasoning and
visual perspective taking and looked for common brain areas
engaged by these tasks with a conjunction analysis. We expected
to find common activation in the left TPJ, based on our hypothe-
sis that this area is implicated in processing perspective differences
(Perner and Leekam, 2008). Our results confirm this expectation,
as we found two clusters in the dorsal left TPJ (angular gyrus and
posterior middle temporal gyrus) that were reliably engaged both
in false belief and in visual perspective processing. In addition to
these clusters, our meta-analysis revealed common areas in the
left middle occipital gyrus and in the precuneus for false belief
reasoning and visual perspective taking. In the next sections, we
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will discuss the potential functional roles of these locations of
convergent brain activation.
LEFT TEMPORO-PARIETAL JUNCTION
Our meta-analytic conjunction found two clusters of conjoint
activation for visual perspective taking and false belief reason-
ing in the left dorsal TPJ, one in the angular gyrus at z = 42 and
another one in the left posterior middle temporal gyrus at z = 32.
No overlap in activation was found for right TPJ areas. These find-
ings support the functional account of TPJ areas reviewed in our
introduction (Perner et al., 2006; Perner and Leekam, 2008). In
this view, the right TPJ is mostly responsible for belief-desire rea-
soning. Accordingly, our meta-analysis found activation only for
false belief reasoning here, and no activation for visual perspective
taking. The left TPJ, on the other hand, is thought to be involved
in processing of alternative perspectives in a domain-general way.
In support of this idea, we found an overlap in brain activation
between visual perspective taking and false belief reasoning here.
An interesting aspect of the found overlap between visual per-
spective taking and false belief reasoning relates to its location
within the left TPJ. Literature reviews have shown that differ-
ent theory of mind tasks engage different parts of the left TPJ
(Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner and Leekam, 2008; Bahnemann
et al., 2010). For example, Perner and Leekam (2008) report that
theory of mind tasks which require processing of a perspective
difference—as for example the false belief tasks–engagemore dor-
sal parts of the left TPJ, whereas theory of mind tasks that do not
require such processing only engage more ventral parts located
around the posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS). This dis-
tinction is also relevant for the interpretation of David et al.’s
(2008) study, which failed to find a functional overlap between
visual perspective taking and theory of mind. David et al. (2008)
used a preference judgment task to test theory of mind. Different
from the false belief task, this task does not require processing of
a perspective difference. Preferences are specific relations between
a person and an object (e.g., “Max does not like apples”, “I do like
apples,” but there is no difference in perspective, for Max and I
have the same view. We both know that he hates apples and I
like apples. Consequently, it becomes clear that—based on the
functional distinction between dorsal and ventral pSTS made in
literature reviews—one would not expect an overlap with visual
perspective taking (in left dorsal TPJ). Whereas visual perspective
taking should engage the left dorsal TPJ, the preference decision
task should engage other areas more ventrally in the TPJ and in
pSTS. Indeed, David et al. (2006) found activation for the prefer-
ence decision task only in the right pSTS, and activation in more
dorsal parietal areas for visual perspective taking. Conversely,
the present meta-analysis looked at a theory of mind task that
does present a perspective difference (false belief) and did find a
functional overlap in the left dorsal TPJ with visual perspective
taking.
To check whether the proposed functional distinction between
dorsal and ventral TPJ can be linked to our observed activa-
tions for visual perspective taking, we performed an informal
review which compares activation for different theory of mind
studies to activation for visual perspective taking as found in
our meta-analysis. In Figure 2, we indicate the results of our
FIGURE 2 | Graphical illustration of the relations between the findings
from our meta-analytic conjunction (black full rectangles) and findings
reported in other theory of mind research. Activation peaks reported in
original studies are separately shown for tasks presenting rational actions
(green full circles), social animations (white full circles), mind in the eyes
(red full circles) and trait judgments (blue full circles). For details, see text.
conjunction analysis between false belief reasoning and visual
perspective taking by black boxes. In addition, we tentatively
summarize temporo-parietal findings from popular theory of
mind tasks by reviewing the peak-activations found in temporo-
parietal areas for 5 studies per task-type. Green circles indicate
locations for rational actions (Brunet et al., 2000; Walter et al.,
2004; Voellm et al., 2006; Brüne et al., 2008). These tasks typ-
ically have a non-verbal format and present a cartoon-story
about a person in the activation tasks. Participants are then
asked about the goal of the person in the story, i.e., to predict
what will happen next. In the control task, questions about non-
mental aspects of the stories are asked (e.g., physical causality).
White circles in Figure 2 indicate activation-peaks reported for
social animations (Castelli et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 2003;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Kana et al., 2009; Das et al., 2012). These
studies typically present video animations of simple geometrical
shapes (see Heider and Simmel, 1944). In the activation con-
dition, the animations portray actions which are typical for an
intentional or social interaction. In the control condition, the
animations show random or purely mechanical movements. For
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each movie, participants are asked to explain what is shown. Red
circles in Figure 2 show activations for the so-called “mind in the
eyes” tasks (after Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). The reviewed stud-
ies (Russell et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2010; Castelli et al., 2010;
Focquaert et al., 2010; Moor et al., 2012) typically show in the
activation task a photograph of a pair of eyes and ask which of
two adjectives (e.g., “concerned” vs. “unconcerned”) best describes
the mental state of the person. In the control tasks, again a photo
of eyes is shown and participants are asked to indicate the gender
of the depicted person.
Rational actions, social animations and mind in the eyes all do
not require awareness of perspectives or processing of perspective
differences for task performance. Consistent with Perner and
Leekam’s (2008) theorizing, Figure 2 shows that activations of
these three task-types are mostly located ventrally and anteri-
orly to our conjunctions results. However, activation for another
type of theory of mind task—judgments about another per-
son’s personality traits—shows some overlap with the dorsal TPJ
areas identified by our conjunction analysis. Trait judgment tasks
(Craik et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004; Murphy
et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011) typically present personality trait-
adjectives. In the activation task, participants are asked to indicate
whether the adjective describes a particular person or not. In
the control tasks, participants perform a non-mental state related
task on similar trait words (e.g., is this word written in upper- or
lower-case?).
As false-belief reasoning and visual-perspective taking, trait
judgments may also require awareness of perspective, but for
different reasons. Traits indicate habitual patterns of behavior,
thought, and emotion. They are characteristic for a person when
the person’s habits deviate from the norm. For instance, a person
is called “anxious” or “nervous” (Mitchell et al., 2002) if she tends
to be concerned about situations where one normally has no rea-
son to be anxious, i.e., the person takes a deviant perspective on
how dangerous or challenging a situation is. Or a person is “stub-
born” (Murphy et al., 2010) if she refuses to change her opinion or
position on a subject when objectively (from the judging person’s
point of view) it is time to give up. So, many traits result from
habitually biased perspectives, and trait judgments are judgments
about whether a person habitually takes a different perspective on
certain aspects of life.
PRECUNEUS
Although the precuneus is part of the typical set of brain areas
active in theory of mind tasks (see e.g., Mar, 2011; Bzdok et al.,
2012), relatively little has been said about its functional role in
processing mental states of others. Several lines of research show
that the area is implicated inmental imagery, i.e., the construction
of a visual scene in absence of the appropriate external stimu-
lus (Thomas, 2010). Studies found activation in the precuneus
for the imagined execution of movements (e.g., Hanakawa et al.,
2003), mental simulation of routes (Ghaem et al., 1997), mental
imagery in deductive reasoning (e.g., Knauff et al., 2003) and for
processing of intervals between tones in music perception (e.g.,
Platel et al., 1997). In their review on the precuneus, Cavanna and
Trimble (2006) suggested that the main function of the precuneus
in theory of mind is mental imagery to represent the perspective
of another person. This function would be compatible with our
finding that this area is engaged both in false belief reasoning and
in visual perspective taking. Unexpectedly, however, we observed
in our follow-up review that the precuneus tended to be engaged
only by level 1 perspective and level 2 imagined viewer rotation
tasks, but not by level 2 visual perspective taking tasks. Based
on the assumption that activation in the precuneus reflects men-
tal imagery to represent another’s perspective, we would clearly
expect activation also for level 2 visual perspective tasks. Contrary
to that, we did not find such activation in any of the five reviewed
level 2 visual perspective taking studies.
LEFT MIDDLE OCCIPITAL GYRUS
Although activation in the lateral occipital cortex can be found
for multiple forms of visual object recognition and visuo-spatial
processing, we are particularly interested by the fact that our
cluster in the left middle occipital gyrus is in good correspondence
to the location of the EBA, with an euclidian distance of 5mm
to the coordinates reported in the seminal paper by Downing
et al. (2001). The EBA was traditionally considered as a category-
selective region for the visual processing of static images of the
human body. Saxe et al. (2005) found that while the right EBA
shows preferential activity for allocentric views on body-parts
(i.e., the typical view we have on others), the left EBA is equally
active for egocentric (i.e., the typical view we have on ourselves)
and allocentric views on body-parts. Astafiev et al. (2004) found
that the EBA is also engaged when participants perform move-
ments (e.g., arm movement) in the absence of visual feedback.
The authors interpreted these results as showing that in addi-
tion to a visual recognition function, the EBA is also engaged
in maintaining our bodily representation by integrating visual,
spatial attention, and sensory-motor signals. Recently, it has also
been found that the EBA is engaged by imagined body move-
ments. For example, Iseki et al. (2008) found activation in the
EBA when participants were asked to imagine walking around in
a room while they were actually lying in the fMRI scanner. (Deen
and McCarthy, 2010) found activation in the EBA when partic-
ipants read stories including passages about human movements
(for example, ‘. . . on Christmas morning, Johnny ran down the
stairs to the tree . . .’) compared to control stories (‘. . . Susan is
sympathetic to children with disabilities . . .’).
Altogether, research on the EBA suggests that this area is
involved in maintaining a bodily self-representation, and that this
process is also engaged when one imagines a body movement of
oneself or others. We speculate that activation in the EBA found
in our meta-analysis may reflect imagined bodily transformations
related to adopting a different visual perspective. We want to note
that our follow-up review found that activation in the EBAmainly
stemmed from level 2 imagined viewer rotation studies. This kind
of task clearly invites imagining a movement of one’s own body.
BRAIN CONNECTIVITY
To give a complementary characterization of our main findings,
we take a look at their structural and functional connectivity
profiles.
For a characterization of connectivity of the left dorsal TPJ,
we refer to the work by Caspers et al. (2011) who present
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structural connectivity fingerprints from probabilistic fiber tract
analyses for different parts of the left inferior parietal lobe. The
activation peak from our conjunction analysis (x = −42, y =
−59, z = 42) falls into the left angular gyrus and more pre-
cisely, in the cytoarchitectonic area PGa according to the Jülich
Histological Atlas (Caspers et al., 2006, 2008) which is accessible
with the software fslview (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslview/).
The connectivity fingerprint for the area PGa is presented in
Caspers et al. (2011, p. 371). In the left hemisphere, area PGa
shows strong structural connectivity to (i) lateral prefrontal areas,
in particular areas of the inferior frontal gyrus (ii) posterior
occipito-temporal areas and posterior fusiform areas (iii) areas
of the insula and (iv) parts of the superior parietal lobe. In addi-
tion, moderate connectivity is found to more anterior parts of the
temporal gyrus and posterior cingulate gyrus/ventral precuneus.
For a characterization of precuneus connectivity, we rely on
results from a recent resting-state functional connectivity analysis
of this area (Zhang and Li, 2012). Results show that more dor-
sal parts of the precuneus are strongly linked to lateral occipital,
superior parietal as well as lateral prefrontal areas in both hemi-
spheres. More ventral parts of the precuneus are strongly linked
to bilateral lingual gyri and the calcarine sulcus, bilateral infe-
rior parietal lobuli (in particular the angular gyri) and the ventral
mPFC. The activation peak from our conjunction analysis lies on
the border between ventral and dorsal precuneus as defined by
Zhang and Li (2012).
Taken together, connectivity data show that our three main
findings, the left dorsal TPJ (corresponding to the angular gyrus
and area PGa), the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus
(roughly corresponding to the posterior occipito-temporal cor-
tex) are structurally and functionally connected to each other. Via
the precuneus, the left TPJ is also connected indirectly to the right
TPJ, and from this perspective, it is evident that the left hemi-
spheric network found in our meta-analysis is linked to a right
hemispheric homologue network. Of particular interest, the con-
nectivity fingerprint for the left TPJ area found in our conjunction
analysis shows that this area is linked both to fronto-parietal
areas (lateral prefrontal cortex, superior parietal lobe) which we
only found in our meta-analysis of visual perspective taking, and
to anterior temporal areas which we only found in our meta-
analysis on false belief reasoning. It is tempting to speculate that
this may reflect how a domain general function—processing of
a perspective difference—can be applied to different problems
(social versus spatial). However, direct evidence from task-based
functional connectivity studies is needed to justify such a claim.
CONCLUSION
To identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and
visuo-spatial perspective taking, we performed ameta-analysis on
false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking. False belief is
a case of social cognition that requires processing of a perspec-
tive difference to understand someone’s mistaken belief about the
world which contrasts with reality. We found common activation
for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left
but not right dorsal TPJ. This fits with the idea that the left dor-
sal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a
domain-general fashion (e.g., Perner and Leekam, 2008). In addi-
tion, we found common activation for false belief reasoning in
the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus. Common acti-
vation in the precuneus can be linked to mental imagery which
may support both social and visuo-spatial scene construction,
whereas common activation in the left middle occipital gyrus—
falling into the EBA–can be linked to imagining a change in one’s
body position in order to get another’s point of view.
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